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results are then applied to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for the
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2
1 Introduction
For a correspondence F from an atomless probability space (T,T , λ) to the
Euclidean space Rn, let I
(T ,G)
F be the set of all E(f |G) such that f is an integrable
selection of F , where E(f |G) is the conditional expectation of f on some given
sub-σ-algebra G of T . By the classical Lyapunov Theorem, the atomless property
of (T,T , λ) implies the convexity of I
(T ,G)
F if G is the trivial σ-algebra {T, ∅}.
However, it is easy to see that such a convexity result fails when we work with a
general sub-σ-algebra G of T .1 Similarly, some other common regularity properties,
such as compactness and preservation of upper hemicontinuity, also fail to hold in
the general case. The purpose of this paper is to characterize the properties of
convexity, compactness and preservation of upper hemicontinuity for conditional
expectations of correspondences.
The key condition we will work with is that T has no G-atom, which means that
T does not coincide with G when they are restricted on any non-trivial set in T .
Based on this condition, Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) established the equivalence
of I
(T ,G)
F and I
(T ,G)
co(F ) for any measurable, integrably bounded and closed valued
correspondence F , where co(F )(t) is the convex hull of F (t) for each t ∈ T . We
show that I
(T ,G)
F is convex for any correspondence F if and only if T has no G-atom.
We also prove that this condition is necessary and sufficient for the weak/weak∗
compactness of I
(T ,G)
F for any integrably bounded and closed valued correspondence
F . A similar necessity and sufficiency result holds for the property on preservation
of upper hemicontinuity. Thus, we not only generalize the classical results on
integration of correspondences2 to the case of conditional expectation, but also
demonstrate the optimality of the relevant condition.
To illustrate the application of the main results, Bayesian games with finite
actions will be considered.3 We formulate the notion of “inter-player information”
to describe the influence of player i’s private information in other players’ payoffs.
The condition of “coarser inter-player information” is proposed below and we show
that this condition is not only sufficient but also necessary for the existence of pure
strategy equilibrium. In particular, interdependent payoffs and correlated types
are allowed in our setting. In addition, we prove the purification results for any
behavioral strategy profile.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some basic definitions are given
1Suppose that F (t) = {0, 1} for all t ∈ T , which is a measurable, integral bounded and compact
valued correspondence. Given G = T , then the conditional expectation of F conditional on G is the set
of all integrable selections, which is not convex.
2See, for example, Aumann (1965) and Hildenbrand (1974).
3There is a substantial literature studying the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in
Bayesian games with finite actions, see Radner and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985),
Khan, Rath and Sun (2006) and Barelli and Duggan (2013).
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in Section 2. We state the results on conditional expectations of correspondences
in Section 3. An application to Bayesian games is presented in Section 4. The
proofs are left in Section 5.
2 Basic Definitions
Suppose that (T,T , λ) is a complete probability space endowed with a countably
additive probability measure λ. A correspondence F from T to Rn is a mapping
from T to the family of nonempty subsets of Rn. It is said to be measurable if for
all open sets O ⊆ Rn, we have {t ∈ T : F (t) ∩O 6= ∅} ∈ T . A measurable function
f from T to Rn is called a selection of F if f(t) ∈ F (t) for λ-almost all t ∈ T .
A correspondence F from T to Rn is said to be convex (resp. closed, compact)
valued if F (t) is convex (resp. closed, compact) for λ-almost all t ∈ T .
A correspondence F from a topological space Y to another topological space Z
is said to be upper hemicontinuous at y0 ∈ Y if for any open set OZ that contains
F (y0), there exists an open neighborhood OY of y0 such that ∀y ∈ OY , F (y) ⊆ OZ .
F is upper hemicontinuous if it is upper hemicontinuous at every point y ∈ Y .
Suppose that G is a sub-σ-algebra of T . For any correspondence F from T to
R
n, let
I
(T ,G)
F = {E(f |G) : f is an integrable selection of F},
where the conditional expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure
λ.
Let LGp (T,R
n) and LG∞(T,R
n) be the set of all G-measurable mappings from T
to Rn with the usual norm. That is,
LGp (T,R
n) =
{
f : f is G-measurable and
(∫
T
‖f‖p dλ
) 1
p
<∞
}
,
LG∞(T,R
n) = {f : f is G-measurable and essentially bounded under λ},
where ‖ · ‖ is the usual norm in Rn and 1 ≤ p < ∞. By the Riesz Representation
Theorem (see Theorem 13.26-28 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)), LGq (T,R
n) can
be viewed as the dual space of LGp (T,R
n), where 1
p
+ 1
q
= 1. Similarly, one can
define LTp (T,R
n) and LT∞(T,R
n).
If there is a real valued function h ∈ LTp (T,R) such that sup{‖x‖ : x ∈ F (t)} ≤
h(t) for λ-almost all t ∈ T , then the correspondence F is said to be p-integrably
bounded, 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ (it is said to be integrably bounded if p = 1).
For any nonnegligible subsetD ∈ T , the restricted probability space (D,GD, λD)
is defined as follows: GD is the σ-algebra {D∩D′ : D′ ∈ G} and λD the probability
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measure re-scaled from the restriction of λ on GD. Furthermore, (D,T D, λD) can
be defined similarly. A subset D ∈ T is said to be a G-atom if λ(D) > 0 and given
any D0 ∈ T
D, there exists a set D1 ∈ G
D such that λ(D0△D1) = 0.
3 The Main Results
In this section, we will show that the condition that T has no G-atom is
sufficient and necessary for the validity of several regularity properties for
conditional expectations of correspondences (convexity, compactness and upper
hemicontinuity).
The sufficiency part of the following theorem is due to Dynkin and Evstigneev
(1976, Theorem 1.2), while the necessity part is from He and Sun (2013, Proposi-
tion 1).
Theorem 1. I
(T ,G)
F = I
(T ,G)
co(F ) for any T -measurable, integrably bounded and closed
valued correspondence F if and only if T has no G-atom.
By the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border
(2006, Theorem 18.13)), I
(T ,G)
F is nonempty for any T -measurable, integrably
bounded and closed valued correspondence F .
If T has no G-atom, then the convexity of I
(T ,G)
F for any correspondence F
is a simple corollary of Theorem 1. It can be also shown that this condition is
necessary for such convexity property.
Corollary 1. The set I
(T ,G)
F is convex for any correspondence F if and only if T
has no G-atom.
Next, we consider the weak/weak∗ compactness of I
(T ,G)
F for a correspondence
F .
Theorem 2. The set I
(T ,G)
F is weakly compact (resp. weak
∗ compact) in LGp (T,R
n)
when 1 ≤ p <∞ (resp. p =∞, and G is countably generated) for any p-integrably
bounded and closed valued correspondence F if and only if T has no G-atom.4
The last property is the preservation of weak/weak∗ upper hemicontinuity for
conditional expectations of correspondences.
Theorem 3. The following conditions are equivalent.
4The equivalence of compactness and sequential compactness in the weak topology of a Banach space
is important in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 below. Such an equivalence still holds for the weak∗
topology of LG∞(T,R
n) when G is countably generated.
5
1. For any closed valued correspondence F from T × Y → Rn (Y is a
metric space) such that there is a p-integrably bounded and compact valued
correspondence G from T to Rn and
a. F (t, y) ⊆ G(t) for λ-almost all t ∈ T and all y ∈ Y ;
b. F (·, y) is T -measurable for all y ∈ Y ;
c. F (t, ·) is upper hemicontinuous for λ-almost all t ∈ T ;
H(y) = I
(T ,G)
Fy
is weakly (resp. weak∗) upper hemicontinuous in LGp (T,R
n)
when 1 ≤ p <∞ (resp. p =∞, and G is countably generated).
2. T has no G-atom.
Note that if 1 < p < ∞, then LGp (T,R
n) is reflexive. Thus, the weak
compactness (resp. weak upper hemicontinuity) and the weak∗ compactness (resp.
weak∗ upper hemicontinuity) are equivalent in LGp (T,R
n) for 1 < p <∞.
Remark 1. He and Sun (2013) proved the existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibria in discounted stochastic games with coarser transition kernels by using
Theorem 1.2 of Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976). Recall that P is an equilibrium
payoff correspondence from T × V to Rn such that P (t, ·) is upper hemicontinuous
and P (·, v) is T -measurable. Let R(v) be the set of all selections of Pv for each
v ∈ V . The classical Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem is applied to the
correspondence co(R), which is convex valued and upper hemicontinuous, to obtain
a selection v′ of coP (·, v′). Theorem 1 then implies the existence of a selection
v∗ of P (·, v′) such that E(v′|G) = E(v∗|G), which leads to the existence of a
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. By Corollary 1, and Theorems 2 and 3,
I
(T ,G)
Pv
is convex, compact valued and upper hemicontinuous. Then the existence
result can be also proved by applying the Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem to
the correspondence I
(T ,G)
Pv
.
4 Bayesian Games with Inter-player Informa-
tion
In this section, we shall propose the condition of “coarser inter-player information”,
and show that this condition is not only sufficient but also necessary for the
existence of pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games with finite actions.
Purification results of behavioral strategy profiles will be also considered.
4.1 Model
A Bayesian game Γ can be described as follows:
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• The set of players: I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• The (private) information space for each player: {Ti}i∈I . Each Ti is endowed
with a countably generated σ-algebra Ti. Let T = ×
n
i=1Ti and T = ⊗
n
i=1Ti.
• For each player i ∈ I, Xi is a finite set of actions. Let X =
∏
1≤i≤nXi.
• The information structure: λ, a probability measure on the measurable space
(T,T ). For each i ∈ I, λi is the marginal probability of λ on Ti and
(Ti,Ti, λi) is atomless. λ is absolutely continuous with respect to
⊗
1≤i≤n λi
and q(t1, . . . , tn) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative.
5
• The payoff functions: {ui}i∈I . Each ui is an integrably bounded mapping
from X × T to R such that ui(x, ·) is T -measurable for each x ∈ X.
Hereafter, the notation −i denotes the set of all players except player i. Let
λ−i = ⊗j 6=iλj . Without loss of generality, we can assume that the mixture of
actions of player i is the simplex M(Xi), and the pure actions in Xi correspond
to vertices of M(Xi). For each player i ∈ I, a behavioral strategy (resp. pure
strategy) is a measurable function from Ti to M(Xi) (resp. Xi), and L
Ti
i is the set
of all behavioral strategies. LT = ×i∈IL
Ti
i .
Given a strategy profile f = (f1, . . . , fn), player i’s expected payoff is
Ui(f) =
∫
T
∫
X
ui(x, t)
∏
j∈I
fj(tj ,dxj)λ(dt).
A behavioral (resp. pure) strategy equilibrium is a behavioral (resp. pure)
strategy profile f∗ = (f∗1 , f
∗
2 , . . . , f
∗
n) such that f
∗
i maximizes Ui(fi, f
∗
−i) for each
i ∈ I.
Consider the density weighted payoff of player i: wi(x, t) = ui(x, t) · q(t)
for each x ∈ X and t ∈ T . Let Gi be the σ-algebra generated by the collection of
mappings
{wj(x, ·, t−i) : x ∈ X, t−i ∈ T−i,∀j 6= i}.
Then Gi ⊆ Ti denotes player i’s inter-player information. That is, Gi is player i’s
information flow to all other players, which describes the influence of player i’s
private information in other players’ payoffs.
4.2 Existence of pure strategy equilibria
In this section, we will prove the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium
in Bayesian games under an appropriate condition called “coarser inter-player
5This assumption is standard in the literature, see Milgrom and Weber (1985).
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information”. More importantly, we will show that this condition is necessary
for the existence result.
Definition 1. Player i is said to have coarser inter-player information if Ti
has no Gi-atom under λi.
A Bayesian game is said to have coarser inter-player information if each player
has coarser inter-player information.
Theorem 4. Every Bayesian game with coarser inter-player information has a
pure strategy equilibrium.
Remark 2. For Bayesian games with coarser inter-player information, players’
payoffs might be interdependent and types could be correlated. In particular, it is
inessential whether types are independent or correlated, since the derivative q can
be absorbed into the density weighted payoff.
If Gi is the trivial σ-algebra {∅, Ti} for each player i ∈ I, then players have
independent priors and private values, and the condition of “coarser inter-player
information” is automatically satisfied since (Ti,Ti, λi) is atomless.
In Theorem 4, we show that the condition of “coarser inter-player information”
is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium. The next theorem
demonstrates that this condition is also necessary.
Given any n ≥ 2 and the player space I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, player i has private
information space (Ti,Ti, λi) and inter-player information Gi such that (Ti,Gi, λi)
is atomless for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let Hn be the collection of all Bayesian games with
the player space I and the above private information spaces {(Ti,Ti/Gi, λi)}i∈I .
Theorem 5. Given the player space I = {1, . . . , n} for n ≥ 2 and the private
information space (Ti,Ti/Gi, λi) for each i ∈ I, every player i has coarser inter-
player information if either of the following conditions holds:
1. every Bayesian game in Hn with type-irrelevant payoffs has a pure strategy
equilibrium;6
2. every Bayesian game in Hn with independent types has a pure strategy
equilibrium.
4.3 Purification
In this subsection, we will consider the purification of behavioral strategy profiles
in Bayesian games with finite actions.
6A Bayesian game is said to have type-irrelevant payoffs if the payoff function of each player does
not depend on the type t ∈ T .
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Definition 2. Let f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) and g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) be two behavioral
strategy profiles.
1. The strategy profiles f and g are said to be payoff equivalent if for each player
i ∈ I, Ui(f) = Ui(g).
2. The strategy profiles f and g are said to be strongly payoff equivalent if
(a) they are payoff equivalent;
(b) for each player i ∈ I and any given behavioral strategy hi, the two strategy
profiles (hi, f−i) and (hi, g−i) are payoff equivalent.
3. The strategy profiles f and g are said to be distribution equivalent if for each
player i ∈ I,
∫
Ti
fi(ti, ·) dλi(ti) =
∫
Ti
gi(ti, ·) dλi(ti).
4. Suppose that f is a pure strategy profile. For player i, fi is said to be belief
consistent with gi if fi(ti) ∈ supp gi(ti) for λi-almost all ti ∈ Ti. Moreover,
f is said to be belief consistent with g if they are belief consistent for each
player i ∈ I.
Now we are ready to give the definitions of purification.
Definition 3. Suppose that g is a pure strategy profile and f is a behavioral strategy
profile. Then g is said to be a strong purification of f if they are strongly payoff
equivalent, distribution equivalent, and belief consistent.
Proposition 1. In a Bayesian game with coarser inter-player information, every
behavioral strategy profile f possesses a strong purification g.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs in Section 3
For a sequence of sets {Am}m∈N in a topological space X, let Ls(Am) be the set
of all x such that for any neighborhood Ox of x there are infinitely many m with
Ox∩Am 6= ∅. The following lemma will be needed in the proofs of the main results.
Lemma 1. Denote {φm}m∈N as a sequence of measurable and p-integrably bounded
mappings from an atomless probability space (T,T , λ) to Rn, 1 ≤ p < ∞. Let
hm = E(φm|G) for each m ∈ N, where G is a sub-σ-algebra of T . Assume that hm
weakly converges to some h0 ∈ L
G
p (T,R
n) as m → ∞. If T has no G-atom, then
there exists a T -measurable mapping φ0 such that
1. φ0(t) ∈ Ls
(
φm(t)
)
for λ-almost all t ∈ T ,
2. E(φ0|G) = h0.
9
Proof. Since the sequence {φm}m∈N is p-integrably bounded in L
T
p (T,R
n), it has
a weakly convergent subsequence by the Riesz/Dunford-Pettis Weak Compactness
Theorem in Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, p.408/p.412). Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that φm weakly converges to some φ ∈ L
T
p (T,R
n). Given any
g ∈ LGq (T,R
n) such that 1
p
+ 1
q
= 1, we have
∫
T
hmg dλ =
∫
T
E(φm|G)g dλ =
∫
T
E(φmg|G) dλ
=
∫
T
φmg dλ→
∫
T
φg dλ
=
∫
T
E(φg|G) dλ =
∫
T
E(φ|G)g dλ.
Thus, hm weakly converges to E(φ|G) in L
G
p (T,R
n), which implies that h0 =
E(φ|G). In addition, {φk, φk+1, . . .} also weakly converges to φ for each k ∈ N. By
Theorem 29 of Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, p.293), there is a sequence of convex
combination of {φk, φk+1, . . .} that converges to φ in Lp norm. For each k ∈ N,
assume that ϕk is the convex combination {φk, φk+1, . . .} such that ‖ϕk−φ‖p ≤
1
k
.
Thus, there is a subsequence of {ϕk}, say itself, which converges to φ λ-almost
everywhere.
Fix t ∈ T such that ϕk(t) converges to φ(t). By Carathe`odary’s convexity the-
orem (see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 5.32)), ϕk(t) =
∑n
j=0 αjkγjk(t),
where
1. for each k ∈ N, αjk ≥ 0 for any j and
∑n
j=0 αjk = 1;
2. for each k ∈ N, γ0k(t), . . . , γnk(t) ∈ {φk(t), φk+1(t), . . .}.
Without loss of generality, assume that for each 0 ≤ j ≤ n, αjk → αj and γjk(t)→
γj(t). Then α1, . . . , αn ≥ 0 and
∑n
j=0 αj = 1. Moreover, γj(t) ∈ Ls(φm(t)). Let
G(t) = Ls(φm(t)). Then φ(t) ∈ co(G(t)).
Since T has no G-atom and G is measurable, integrably bounded and closed
valued, Theorem 1 implies that I
(T ,G)
G = I
(T ,G)
co(G). Thus, there exists a T -measurable
selection φ0 of G such that E(φ0|G) = E(φ|G) = h0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. First, we assume that T has no G-atom. Pick two measurable
selections φ1 and φ2 of F . Let G(t) = {φ1(t), φ2(t)}. Then G is a T -measurable,
integrably bounded, closed valued correspondence. By Theorem 1, we have
I
(T ,G)
G = I
(T ,G)
co(G), which implies that I
(T ,G)
G is convex. For any α ∈ [0, 1], there exists
a T -measurable selection φ0 of G such that E(φ0|G) = αE(φ1|G)+(1−α)E(φ2 |G).
Since φ0 is also a selection of F , I
(T ,G)
F is convex.
Conversely, suppose that T has a G-atom D with λ(D) > 0. Define a
10
correspondence
F (t) =

{0, 1} t ∈ D;{0} t /∈ D.
It is shown in Proposition 1 of He and Sun (2013) that I
(T ,G)
F is not convex.
7
Below we prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that T has no G-atom and 1 ≤ p < ∞. It is
sufficient to show that I
(T ,G)
F is weakly sequentially compact in L
G
p (T,R
n). Fix an
arbitrary sequence of T -measurable selections {φm}m∈N of F . Let hm = E(φm|G)
for each m ∈ N. We need to show that there is a subsequence of {hm}m∈N
which weakly converges in LGp (T,R
n) to some point in I
(T ,G)
F . Since the sequence
{φm}m∈N is p-integrably bounded, it has a weakly convergent subsequence due to
the Riesz/Dunford-Pettis Weak Compactness Theorem in Royden and Fitzpatrick
(2010, p.408/p.412). Without loss of generality, assume that φm weakly converges
to some φ ∈ LTp (T,R
n). As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, hm also weakly
converges to E(φ|G) in LGp (T,R
n). By Lemma 1, there exists a T -measurable
selection φ0 of Ls(φm) such that E(φ0|G) = E(φ|G). Since F is compact valued,
Ls(φm(t)) ⊆ F (t) for λ-almost all t ∈ T . Thus, φ0 is a selection of F , and we are
done.
Next, we consider the case p = ∞ and G is countably generated. Since F is
essentially bounded by some positive constant C, I
(T ,G)
F is also norm bounded by
C. By Alaoglu’s Theorem (see Theorem 6.21 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)),
the closed ball with radius C (the C-ball) is weak∗ compact in LG∞(T,R
n). We
only need to show that I
(T ,G)
F is weak
∗ closed in the C-ball. Since G is countably
generated, LG1 (T,R
n) is separable, which implies that the C-ball is metrizable in
the weak∗ topology (see Theorem 6.30 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)). Suppose
that {φm} is a sequence of T -measurable selections of F and hm weak
∗ converges
to h0 ∈ L
G
∞(T,R
n) as m → ∞, where hm = E(φm|G) for each m. Then hm
also weakly converges to h0 in L
G
1 (T,R
n). Moreover, the condition that F is ∞-
integrably bounded (i.e., essentially bounded) implies that F is integrably bounded.
By Lemma 1, there exists a T -measurable selection φ0 of Ls(φm) such that h0 =
E(φ0|G). Since F is compact valued, φ0(t) ∈ Ls(φm(t)) ⊆ F (t) for λ-almost all
t ∈ T . That is, φ0 is a T -measurable selection of F and h0 ∈ I
(T ,G)
F . Therefore,
I
(T ,G)
F is weak
∗ closed in the C-ball.
7For simplicity, the target space of the correspondence is R. One can easily define a new
correspondence on Rn such that each of other n− 1 dimensions only contains 0.
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Conversely, suppose that T has a G-atom D with λ(D) > 0. Consider the
correspondence F as defined in the proof of Corollary 1. Pick an orthonormal
subset {ϕm}m∈N of L
T D
2 (D,R) on the atomless probability space (D,T
D, λD) such
that ϕm takes value in {−1, 1} and
∫
D
ϕm dλ
D = 0 for each m ∈ N. Let
φm(t) =


ϕm(t)+1
2 t ∈ D;
0 t /∈ D.
Then φm is a T -measurable selection of F for each m ∈ N.
Pick a set E ∈ T D. By Bessel’s inequality (see (Royden and Fitzpatrick, 2010,
p.316)),
∫
D
1Eϕm dλ
D → 0 as m → ∞, where 1E is the indicator function of the
set E. Thus, for any E1 ∈ T ,∫
T
1E1φm dλ =
1
2
∫
D
1E1∩Dϕm dλ+
1
2
λ(E1 ∩D)→
1
2
λ(E1 ∩D). (1)
Given any nonnegative function ψ ∈ LT1 (T,R), ψ will be the increasing limit of
a sequence of simple functions {ψk}k∈N (finite linear combination of measurable
indicator functions). Fix any ǫ > 0. By the dominated convergence theorem, there
exists a positive integer K0 > 0 such that for each k ≥ K0,
∫
T
|ψ − ψk|dλ < ǫ.
Then we have∣∣∣∣
∫
T
ψφm dλ−
1
2
∫
T
ψ1D dλ
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣
∫
T
ψφm dλ−
∫
T
ψK0φm dλ
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣
∫
T
ψK0φm dλ−
1
2
∫
T
ψK01D dλ
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣12
∫
T
ψK01D dλ−
1
2
∫
T
ψ1D dλ
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
T
|ψ − ψK0 |dλ+
∣∣∣∣
∫
T
ψK0φm dλ−
1
2
∫
T
ψK01D dλ
∣∣∣∣+
∫
T
|ψK0 − ψ|dλ.
The first and the third terms are less than ǫ. By Equation (1) and the fact that ψK0
is a simple function, the second term goes to 0 as m → ∞. Hence,
∫
T
ψφm dλ →
1
2
∫
T
ψ1D dλ as m → ∞. Given any ψ ∈ L
T
1 (T,R), we can obtain
∫
T
ψφm dλ →
1
2
∫
T
ψ1D dλ as m→∞ by writing ψ as the sum of its positive and negative parts.
Therefore, φm weak
∗ converges to φ = 121D in L
T
∞(T,R). Thus, E(φm|G) ∈ I
(T ,G)
F
weak∗ converges to 12E(1D|G) in L
G
∞(T,R) as shown in the proof of Lemma 1. It
is shown in He and Sun (2013) that 12E(1D|G) /∈ I
(T ,G)
F , which implies that I
(T ,G)
F
is not weak∗ compact in LG∞(T,R).
For 1 ≤ p <∞, just note that F is also p-integrably bounded, and φm weakly
converges to φ = 121D in L
T
p (T,R).
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that T has no G-atom and 1 ≤ p < ∞. By
Theorem 2, we know that I
(T ,G)
G is weakly compact, and hence weakly sequentially
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compact. Pick {ym}
∞
m=0 ⊆ Y and {φm}m∈N such that φm is a T -measurable
selection of Fym . Let hm = E(φm|G) for each m ∈ N. Suppose that hm weakly
converges to some h0 ∈ L
G
p (T,R
n) and ym converges to some y0 ∈ Y . By Lemma 1,
there exists a T -measurable selection φ0 of Ls(φm) such that h0 = E(φ0|G).
Since Ft(·) is upper hemicontinuous for λ-almost all t ∈ T , φ0(t) ∈ Ls(φm(t)) ⊆
Ls(Fym(t)) ⊆ Fy0(t) for λ-almost all t ∈ T . That is, φ0 is a T -measurable selection
of Fy0 and h0 ∈ H(y0). Therefore, H is weakly upper hemicontinuous. The case
that p =∞ and G is countably generated follows from a similar argument by noting
that any closed ball in LG∞(T,R
n) is metrizable.
Conversely, suppose that T has a G-atom D with λ(D) > 0. Let G be the
correspondence as in Corollary 1
G(t) =

{0, 1} t ∈ D;{0} t /∈ D.
Let Y = { 1
m
}m≥1 ∪ {0} endowed with the usual metric, F (t, 0) = G(t) and
F (t, 1
m
) = {φm(t)} for all t ∈ T and m ≥ 1, where φm is the same as in the
converse part of the proof of Theorem 2. Then G is compact valued and bounded,
and F (t, ·) is upper hemicontinuous for all t ∈ T .
Consider the correspondence G. For 1 ≤ p < ∞, since I
(T ,G)
G is p-integrably
bounded, it is relatively weakly sequentially compact in LGp (T,R) due to the
Riesz/Dunford-Pettis Weak Compactness Theorem in Royden and Fitzpatrick
(2010, p.408/p.412), and hence relatively weakly compact. For p = ∞, I
(T ,G)
G is
relatively weak∗ compact in LG∞(T,R
n) due to Alaoglu’s Theorem. Thus, H(y) is
a subset of a fixed weakly (resp. weak∗) compact set for all y ∈ Y when 1 ≤ p <∞
(resp. p =∞).
For the sequence { 1
m
}, 1
m
→ 0 and φm is a selection of F 1
m
. As shown in the
proof above, E(φm|G) weakly (resp. weak
∗) converges to 12E(1D|G) in L
G
p (T,R)
for 1 ≤ p <∞ (resp. p =∞), but there is no T -measurable selection φ0 of G such
that E(φ0|G) =
1
2E(1D|G). Therefore,
1
2E(1D|G) /∈ H(0) = I
(T ,G)
F0
, which implies
that H(y) is neither weakly upper hemicontinuous in LGp (T,R) for 1 ≤ p <∞ nor
weak∗ upper hemicontinuous in LG∞(T,R).
5.2 Proofs in Section 4
5.2.1 Proofs in Section 4.2
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose that mi is the cardinality of Xi for each i ∈ I. Let
△i = {(a
i
1, . . . , a
i
mi
) :
∑
1≤k≤mi
aik = 1, a
i
k ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ mi}. The mixture of
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actions of player i in M(Xi) can be regarded as elements in the simplex △i, and
the pure actions in Xi correspond to the extreme points of △i. Denote L
Gi
i as the
set of all Gi-measurable functions from Ti to M(Xi). Without loss of generality,
it can be viewed as LGi∞(Ti,△i), and embedded in L
Gi
∞(Ti,R
mi) endowed with the
weak∗ topology.
By the Riesz representation theorem (see Theorem 13.28 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006)), LGi∞(Ti,R
mi) can be viewed as the dual space of LGi1 (Ti,R
mi). Then
LGi∞(Ti,R
mi) is a locally convex, Hausdorff topological vector space under the
weak∗ topology. By Alaoglu’s Theorem (see Theorem 6.21 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006)), the closed ball with radius C ≥ 1 (the C-ball) is weak∗ compact in
LGi∞(Ti,R
mi). Since Gi is countable generated, L
Gi
1 (Ti,R
mi) is separable, which
implies that the C-ball is metrizable in the weak∗ topology (see Theorem 6.30 of
Aliprantis and Border (2006)).
It is obvious that LGii is included in the C-ball, we need to show that L
Gi
i
is weak∗ closed. That is, for any sequence {gk}k∈N ∈ L
Gi
i such that gk weak
∗
converges to some g0 ∈ L
Gi
∞(Ti,R
mi), we need to show g0 ∈ L
Gi
i . Since gk weak
∗
converges to g0 ∈ L
Gi
∞(Ti,R
mi), it also weakly converges to g0 in L
Gi
1 (Ti,R
mi).
Following an analogous argument in the proof of Lemma 1, one can show that
g0(ti) ∈ co (Ls(gk(ti))) for λi-almost all ti ∈ Ti. Since △i is closed and convex,
co (Ls(gk(ti))) ⊆ △i for λi-almost all ti ∈ Ti. Thus, g0(ti) ∈ △i for λi-almost all
ti ∈ Ti, and g0 ∈ L
Gi
i . Therefore, L
Gi
i is nonempty, convex, and compact under the
weak∗ topology. Let LG = ×i∈IL
Gi
i endowed with the product topology.
Given a pure strategy profile h, let hi = E
λi(hi|Gi) ∈ L
Gi
i , and h
k
i denote the
k-th dimension of hi for each player i ∈ I and 1 ≤ k ≤ mi. For any distinct i, j ∈ I,
x−j ∈ X−j , t−j ∈ T−j , and D ∈ Gj,∫
Tj
1D(tj)ui(x−j , hj(tj), t−j , tj)q(tj , t−j)λj(dtj)
=
∫
Tj
1D(tj)wi(x−j , hj(tj), t−j , tj)λj(dtj)
=
∫
Tj
1D(tj)
mj∑
k=1
(
wi(x−j , a
j
k, t−j, tj) · h
k
j (tj)
)
λj(dtj)
=
∫
Tj
Eλj
(
1D(tj)
mj∑
k=1
(
wi(x−j , a
j
k, t−j , tj) · h
k
j (tj)
)
|Gj
)
λj(dtj)
=
∫
Tj
1D(tj)
mj∑
k=1
Eλj
(
wi(x−j , a
j
k, t−j , tj) · h
k
j (tj)|Gj
)
λj(dtj)
=
∫
Tj
1D(tj)
mj∑
k=1
wi(x−j, a
j
k, t−j, tj) · E
λj
(
hkj (tj)|Gj
)
λj(dtj)
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=∫
Tj
1D(tj)
mj∑
k=1
wi(x−j, a
j
k, t−j, tj) · h
k
j (tj)λj(dtj)
=
∫
Tj
1D(tj)
∫
Xj
wi(x−j, xj , t−j , tj)hj(tj ,dxj)λj(dtj).
The first three equalities are obvious. The fourth and fifth equalities hold since 1D
and wi(x, t−j , ·) are Gj-measurable for any x ∈ X and t−j ∈ T−j . The sixth equality
is due to the definition of hj , and the last one is just rewriting the summation as
integration. Thus, for λj-almost all tj ∈ Tj ,
Eλj (wi(x−j, hj(tj), t−j , tj)|Gj) =
∫
Xj
wi(x−j , xj , t−j , tj)hj(tj,dxj). (2)
Fix player 1. For any t1 ∈ T1 and x1 ∈ X1, we have∫
T
−1
u1(x1, h−1(t−1), t1, t−1)q(t1, t−1)λ−1(dt−1)
=
∫
T
−1
w1(x1, h−1(t−1), t1, t−1)λ−1(dt−1)
=
∫
T
−(1,2)
∫
T2
w1(x1, h2(t2), h−(1,2)(t−(1,2)), t−2, t2)λ2(dt2)λ−(1,2)(dt−(1,2))
=
∫
T
−(1,2)
∫
T2
Eλ2
(
w1(x1, h2(t2), h−(1,2)(t−(1,2)), t−2, t2)|G2
)
λ2(dt2)λ−(1,2)(dt−(1,2))
=
∫
T
−(1,2)
∫
T2
∫
X2
w1(x1, x2, h−(1,2)(t−(1,2)), t−2, t2)h2(t2,dx2)λ2(dt2)λ−(1,2)(dt−(1,2))
= · · ·
=
∫
T
−1
∫
X
−1
w1(x1, x−1, t1, t−1)h−1(t−1,dx−1)λ−1(dt−1),
where the subscript −(1, 2) denotes the set of all players except players 1 and 2.
The first equality is due to the definition of density weighted payoff. The second
equality is due to the Fubini property. The third equality holds by taking the
conditional expectation. The fourth equality is implied by Equation (2). Then
the previous four equalities are repeated for n − 2 times (from T3 to Tn). This
procedure is omitted in the fifth equality, and finally leads to the last equality.
One can repeat the argument and show that for any i ∈ I, xi ∈ Xi and ti ∈ Ti∫
T
−i
ui(xi, h−i(t−i), ti, t−i)q(ti, t−i)λ−i(dt−i)
=
∫
T
−i
∫
X
−i
wi(xi, x−i, ti, t−i)h−i(t−i,dx−i)λ−i(dt−i).
(3)
15
For each i ∈ I, let Fi be a mapping from Ti ×Xi ×L
G to R defined as follows:
Fi(ti, xi, g1, . . . , gn) =
∫
T
−i
∫
X
−i
wi(xi, x−i, ti, t−i)g−i(t−i,dx−i)λ−i(dt−i).
It is clear that Fi is Ti-measurable on Ti and continuous on L
G , where LG is endowed
with the weak∗ topology. For each i ∈ I, the best response correspondence Gi from
Ti × L
G to Xi is given by
Gi(ti, g1, . . . , gn) = argmaxxi∈XiFi(ti, xi, g1, . . . , gn).
For each ti, Berge’s maximal theorem implies that Gi is nonempty, compact-
valued, and upper-hemicontinuous on LG . For any xi and (g1, . . . , gn), Fi is
Ti-measurable. Then Gi(·, g1, . . . , gn) admits a Ti-measurable selection. Thus,
Eλi (Gi(·, g1, . . . , gn)|Gi) is nonempty. Since Ti has no Gi-atom, by Corollary 1
and Theorems 2 and 3, it is convex, weak∗ compact-valued, and weak∗ upper-
hemicontinuous on LG .
Consider a correspondence from LG to itself:
ψ(g1, . . . , gn) = ×
n
i=1E
λi (Gi(·, g1, . . . , gn)|Gi) .
It is clear that ψ is nonempty, convex, weak∗ compact-valued, and weak∗ upper-
hemicontinuous on LG . By Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed-point theorem, there exists a
fixed point (g∗1 , . . . , g
∗
n) of ψ. Thus for each i, there exists some Ti-measurable
selection f∗i of Gi(·, g
∗
1 , . . . , g
∗
n) such that g
∗
i = E
λi (f∗i |Gi).
With the strategy profile (f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
n), the payoff of player i is
Ui(f
∗) =
∫
T
wi(f
∗
i (ti), f
∗
−i(t−i), ti, t−i)λ(dt)
=
∫
Ti
∫
T
−i
wi(f
∗
i (ti), f
∗
−i(t−i), ti, t−i)λ−i(dt−i)λi(dti)
=
∫
Ti
∫
T
−i
∫
X
−i
wi(f
∗
i (ti), x−i, ti, t−i)g
∗
i (t−i,dx−i)λ−i(dt−i)λi(dti).
The first equality holds due to the definition of Ui. The second equality holds
based on the Fubini property, and the third equality relies on Equation (3). By the
choice of (g∗1 , . . . , g
∗
n), we have that (f
∗
1 , . . . , f
∗
n) is a pure strategy equilibrium.
To prove Theorem 5, we first consider an auxiliary game.
Example 1. Consider an m × m zero-sum “matching pennies” game Γ with
asymmetric information. There are two players, and the action space for both
players is A1 = A2 = {a1, a2, . . . am}, m ≥ 2. The payoff matrix for player 1 is
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given below.
Player 1
Player 2
a1 a2 a3 · · · am
a1 1 −1 0 · · · 0
a2 0 1 −1 · · · 0
a3 0 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
am −1 0 · · · 0 1
Player i has a private information space Li = [0, 1] and (l1, l2) follows the
uniform distribution τ on the triangle of the unit square 0 ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ 1. Then
it is obvious that the Radon-Nikodym derivative of τ with respect to the Lebesgue
measure on the unit square is
ρ(l1, l2) =

2, 0 ≤ l1 ≤ l2 ≤ 1;0, otherwise.
Let τi be the marginal distribution of τ on Li for i = 1, 2. Then the Lebesgue
measure η is absolutely continuous with respect to τ1 on [0, 1] with the Radon-
Nikodym derivative β1(l1) =
1
2(1−l1)
if 0 < l1 < 1 and 0 otherwise, and η is
absolutely continuous with respect to τ2 with the Radon-Nikodym derivative β2(l2) =
1
2l2
if 0 < l2 < 1 and 0 otherwise. The two probability measures τ1 and τ2 are both
atomless. Let ρ′ be the corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivative of τ with respect
to τ1 ⊗ τ2:
ρ′(l1, l2) = ρ(l1, l2) · β1(l1) · β2(l2) =


1
2(1−l1)l2
, 0 < l1 ≤ l2 < 1;
0, otherwise.
As is well known, there exists a measure preserving mapping hi from (Ti,Gi, λi)
to ([0, 1],B, τi) such that for any E ∈ Gi, there exists a set E
′ ∈ B such that
λi(E△h
−1
i (E
′)) = 0. For i = 1, 2, let πi be a probability measure on (Ti,Ti) which
is absolutely continuous with respect to λi with the Radon-Nikodym derivative
βi(hi(ti)). Since βi(hi(ti)) is positive for λi-almost all ti, λi is also absolutely
continuous with respect to πi.
Proof of Theorem 5.
(1) First we consider the following 2-player game Γ′, and then extend it to
an n-player game. Player 1 and 2’s action spaces and payoffs are the same as in
the game Γ. The private information space for player i is (Ti,Ti, λi), q(t1, t2) =
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ρ′(h1(t1), h2(t2)), and the common prior λ has the Radon-Nikodym derivative q
with respect to λ1⊗λ2. It can be easily checked that λi is the marginal probability
measure of λ for i = 1, 2.
Suppose that Γ1 has a pure strategy equilibrium (f1, f2). Let E
1
j = {t1 ∈
T1 : f1(t1) = aj} and E
2
j = {t2 ∈ T2 : f2(t2) = aj} for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then we shall
show that for λ2-almost all t2 ∈ T2∫
E11
q(t1, t2)λ1(dt1) = . . . =
∫
E1m
q(t1, t2)λ1(dt1), (4)
and for λ1-almost all t1 ∈ T1,∫
E21
q(t1, t2)λ2(dt2) = . . . =
∫
E2m
q(t1, t2)λ2(dt2). (5)
Suppose that α and −α are the equilibrium payoffs of player 1 and player 2,
respectively. Denote am+1 = a1, E
1
m+1 = E
1
1 and E
2
m+1 = E
2
1 . For j = 1, . . . ,m,
let
C1j =
{
t1 ∈ T1 :
∫
E2j
q(t1, t2)λ2(dt2) >
∫
E2j+1
q(t1, t2)λ2(dt2)
}
and
C2j =
{
t2 ∈ T2 :
∫
E1j
q(t1, t2)λ1(dt1) >
∫
E1j+1
q(t1, t2)λ1(dt1)
}
.
Now we define a new strategy for players 1 and 2 as follows:
f ′1(t1) =

aj t1 ∈ C
1
j \
(
∪1≤k<jC
1
k
)
,
a1 otherwise;
and
f ′2(t2) =

aj+1 t2 ∈ C
2
j \
(
∪1≤k<jC
2
k
)
,
a1 otherwise.
We claim that player 2 can choose the strategy f ′2 and get a nonnegative payoff.
If player 2 takes action aj+1 at state t2, then his interim expected payoff is
∫
T1
u2(f1(t1), aj+1)q(t1, t2)λ1(t1) =
m∑
k=1
∫
E1
k
u2(ak, aj+1)q(t1, t2)λ1(t1)
=
∫
E1j
q(t1, t2)λ1(t1)−
∫
E1j+1
q(t1, t2)λ1(t1).
1. if t2 ∈ C
2
j , then choosing the action aj+1 gives player 2 a strictly positive
payoff;
18
2. if t2 ∈ T2 \
(
∪1≤j≤mC
2
j
)
, then player 2 is indifferent between any action and
gets a payoff 0.
Thus, player 2 can choose the strategy f ′2 and guarantee himself a nonnegative
payoff, which implies that α ≤ 0. Similarly, one can analyze the payoff of player 1
and show that α ≥ 0. As a result, α = 0, which implies that λ1
(
∪1≤j≤mC
1
j
)
= 0
and λ2
(
∪1≤j≤mC
2
j
)
= 0. As a result, Equation (4) holds for λ2-almost all t2 ∈ T2,
and Equation (5) holds for λ1-almost all t1 ∈ T1.
For λ2-almost all t2 ∈ T2,
∫
T1
q(t1, t2)λ1(dt1) = 1, we have
∫
E1j
q(t1, t2)λ1(dt1) =
1
m
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. For each E1j , there exists a set Dj ⊆ L1 such that
λ1(E
1
j△h
−1
1 (Dj)) = 0, implying that∫
Dj
ρ′(l1, h2(t2))τ1(dl1) =
∫
Dj
ρ(l1, h2(t2))β2(h2(t2))η(dl1) =
1
m
,
and hence
∫
Dj
ρ(l1, h2(t2))η(dl1) =
2(h2(t2))
m
for λ2-almost all t2 ∈ T2. That is, for
λ2-almost all t2 ∈ T2, η(Dj ∩ [0, h2(t2)]) =
h2(t2)
m
.
As a result,
π1(E
1
j ∩ h
−1
1 ([0, h2(t2)])) =
∫
E1j∩h
−1
1 ([0,h2(t2)])
β1(h1(t1))λ1(dt1)
=
∫
Dj∩[0,h2(t2)]
β1(l1)τ1(dl1)
= η(Dj ∩ [0, h2(t2)])
=
h2(t2)
m
.
Thus, π1(E
1
j ) =
1
m
. In addition, π1(h
−1
1 ([0, h2(t2)])) = η ([0, h2(t2)]) = h2(t2)
for λ2-almost all t2 ∈ T2. Therefore, π1(E
1
j ∩ h
−1
1 ([0, h2(t2)])) = π1(E
1
j ) ·
π1(h
−1
1 ([0, h2(t2)])) for λ2-almost all t2 ∈ T2. Since {[0, h2(t2)]}t2∈T2 generates
the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1] modulo null sets, {h−11 ([0, h2(t2)])}t2∈T2 generates G1
on T1 modulo null sets, which implies that E
1
j is independent of G1 under π1. As
m is arbitrary, we have proved that for any natural number m ≥ 2, there exist m
disjoint subsets {E1j }1≤j≤m which are of measure
1
m
and independent of G1 under
π1. Thus, T1 has no G1-atom under π1. Since π1 and λ1 are absolutely continuous
with respect to each other, T1 has no G1-atom under λ1. Similarly, one can show
that T2 has no G2-atom under λ2.
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We extend the game Γ′ to an n-player game Γ2. Players 1 and 2 in Γ2 share
the same payoffs, action sets and private information spaces with those in the
game Γ′. Other players in Γ2 are dummy in the sense that player k has private
information space (Tk,Tk, λk), and only one action set Xk = {a} for 3 ≤ k ≤ n.
The common prior λ is absolutely continuous with respect to
⊗
1≤i≤n λi with
the Radon-Nikodym derivative q(t1, t2). Hence, the payoffs of all players in the
Bayesian game Γ2 are type-irrelevant. If Γ2 has a pure strategy equilibrium, then
the analysis above shows that players 1 and 2 have coarser inter-player information.
For any 3 ≤ j ≤ n, one can construct a new n-player game Γj in which players 1
and j are active while all other players are dummy. The payoff functions, action
sets and private information spaces of players 1 and j are defined similarly as those
of players 1 and 2 in the game Γ2. Adopting the above argument, it can be shown
that players 1 and j have coarser inter-player information. Therefore, all players
have coarser inter-player information.
(2) Now we construct a new game Γ′′ based on the game Γ′ above. Suppose that
players 1 and 2’s action spaces and private information spaces are the same, while
the payoff of player i in the game Γ′′ is given by vi(x, t) = ui(x)·q(t) for each x ∈ X
and t ∈ T , where ui is the payoff function of player i and q is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative in the game Γ′. Players have independent types and the common prior
λ = λ1 ⊗ λ2. It is obvious that the game Γ
′′ is essentially the same compared
with the game Γ′ if one considers the density weighted payoff. Extending the game
Γ′′ to an n-player game with 2 active players and n − 2 dummy players, then
one can follow the proof in (1) and show that the two active players have coarser
inter-player information if the game Γ′′ has a pure strategy equilibrium. Since
those two active players are arbitrarily chosen, all players have coarser inter-player
information.
5.2.2 Proofs in Section 4.3
Proof of Proposition 1. Given any behavioral strategy profile f , xi ∈ Xi and ti ∈
Ti, let
V fi (xi, ti) =
∫
T
−i
∫
X
−i
ui(xi, x−i, ti, t−i)q(ti, t−i)
∏
j 6=i
fj(tj,dxj)λ−i(dt−i).
For any µi ∈ M(Xi), define
W
(µi,f)
i (ti) =
∫
Xi
V fi (xi, ti)µi(dxi).
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Let ci(ti, xi) = 1supp fi(ti)(xi) for each ti ∈ Ti, xi ∈ Xi and i ∈ I. Denote c
µi
i (ti) =∫
Xi
ci(ti, xi)µi(dxi) for any µi ∈ M(Xi). Then given any behavioral strategy hi,
we slightly abuse the notation by letting W
(hi,f)
i (ti) =
∫
Xi
V fi (xi, ti)hi(ti,dxi) and
chii (ti) =
∫
Xi
ci(ti, xi)hi(ti,dxi).
Define a correspondence
Hfi (ti) = {
(
xi, V
f
i (xi, ti), ci(ti, xi)
)
: xi ∈ Xi}.
We have
co(Hfi )(ti) = {
(
µi,W
(µi,f)
i (ti), c
µi
i (ti)
)
: µi ∈M(Xi)}.
By Theorem 1, we have Eλi(Hfi |Gi) = E
λi(co(Hfi )|Gi).
For each i ∈ I, (fi,W
(fi,f)
i , c
fi
i ) is a measurable selection of co(H
f
i ). Thus,
there is a Ti-measurable mapping gi from Ti to Xi such that E
λi(gi|Gi) =
Eλi(fi|Gi), E
λi(W
(gi,f)
i |Gi) = E
λi(W
(fi,f)
i |Gi) and E
λi(cgii |Gi) = E
λi(cfii |Gi). Then
Eλi(gi|Gi) = E
λi(fi|Gi) for each i implies that f and g are distribution equivalent.
Given any ti ∈ Ti and xi ∈ Xi,
V gi (xi, ti) =
∫
T
−i
∫
X
−i
ui(xi, x−i, ti, t−i)q(ti, t−i)
∏
j 6=i
gj(tj ,dxj)λ−i(dt−i)
=
∫
T
−i
∫
X
−i
wi(xi, x−i, ti, t−i)
∏
j 6=i
gj(tj ,dxj)λ−i(dt−i)
=
∫
T
−i
∫
X
−i
wi(xi, x−i, ti, t−i)
∏
j 6=i
Eλj (gj |Gj) (tj,dxj)λ−i(dt−i)
=
∫
T
−i
∫
X
−i
wi(xi, x−i, ti, t−i)
∏
j 6=i
Eλj (fj|Gj) (tj,dxj)λ−i(dt−i)
=
∫
T
−i
wi(xi, f−i(t−i), ti, t−i)λ−i(dt−i)
= V fi (xi, ti).
The third and fifth equalities are due to Equation (3), and the fourth equality
holds since Eλi(gi|Gi) = E
λi(fi|Gi) for each i ∈ I. Thus, W
(hi,g)
i (ti) = W
(hi,f)
i (ti)
for any hi and ti ∈ Ti.
We have
Ui(g) =
∫
Ti
W
(gi,g)
i (ti)λi(dti) =
∫
Ti
W
(gi,f)
i (ti)λi(dti)
=
∫
Ti
Eλi(W
(gi,f)
i |Gi)λi(dti) =
∫
Ti
Eλi(W
(fi,f)
i |Gi)λi(dti)
=
∫
Ti
W
(fi,f)
i (ti)λi(dti) = Ui(f),
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and
Ui(hi, g−i) =
∫
Ti
W
(hi,g)
i (ti)λi(dti) =
∫
Ti
W
(hi,f)
i (ti)λi(dti)
= Ui(hi, f−i).
Thus, f and g are strongly payoff equivalent.
Finally, since Eλi(cgii |Gi) = E
λi(cfii |Gi), we have∫
Ti
cgii (ti)λi(dti) =
∫
Ti
cfii (ti)λi(dti) =
∫
Ti
∫
Xi
ci(ti, xi)fi(ti,dxi)λi(dti) = 1
which implies that c(ti, gi(ti)) = c
gi
i (ti) = 1 for λi-almost all ti ∈ Ti. That is,
gi(ti) ∈ supp fi(ti) for λi-almost all ti ∈ Ti, fi and gi are belief consistent. Since i
is arbitrarily chosen, f and g are belief consistent.
Therefore, g is a strong purification of f .
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